Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services by Abrate, Graziano et al.
sustainability
Article
Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of
Local Public Services
Graziano Abrate 1,2 , Federico Boffa 3,*, Fabrizio Erbetta 1,2 and Davide Vannoni 4,5
1 Department of Economics and Business, University of Piemonte Orientale, 28100 Novara, Italy;
graziano.abrate@uniupo.it (G.A.); fabrizio.erbetta@uniupo.it (F.E.)
2 HERMES (Higher Education and Research on Mobility regulation and the Economics of local Services),
10122 Torino, Italy
3 School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, 39100 Bolzano, Italy
4 Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, University of Torino, 10134 Torino, Italy;
davide.vannoni@unito.it
5 Collegio Carlo Alberto, 10122 Torino, Italy
* Correspondence: fboffa@unibz.it; Tel.: +39-0474-013647
Received: 7 November 2018; Accepted: 11 December 2018; Published: 14 December 2018 
Abstract: This paper explores the link between voters’ information, corruption, and efficiency in the
context of a career concern model, where politically connected local monopolies are in charge of the
provision of a local public service. We find that both a corrupt environment and a low level of voters’
information on managerial actions induce managers to reduce effort levels, thereby contributing
to drive down efficiency. We test our predictions using data on solid waste management services
provided by a large sample of Italian municipalities. We estimate a stochastic cost frontier model
that provides robust evidence that services produced in more corrupted regions with low voters’
information are substantially less cost-efficient.
Keywords: fight against corruption; economic vote; inefficiency of the public sector; new models of
public management; Governance 4.0
1. Introduction
In Western countries, many local public services, including water provision, gas distribution,
and waste collection and disposal, are managed as local monopolies. They are typically operated by
firms with tight political connections, if not directly by the local government (in-house provision),
usually under soft budget constraints. Local public utilities sharing the above characteristics may
be particularly inefficient, due to the interplay of two factors, managerial slack and corruption.
Firms with market power are particularly exposed to managerial slack, especially in the absence
of effective monitoring devices or appropriate incentive schemes [1]. Markets with an extensive degree
of interaction between politicians and firms tend to be associated to higher levels of corruption and
patronage [2]. This is empirically documented by Menozzi et al. [3], in their analysis of the effects of
political connections on utilities’ performances.
In this non-competitive environment of local public service provision, where do incentives
for managers to generate value for the company come from? In this paper, we attempt to answer
this question. We argue that managerial incentives to efficiency originate from two sources. One is
political accountability. Informed voters, when they perceive the company is mismanaged, hold the
politician associated with that manager accountable, and base their re-election decision on that
consideration. A second one is the level of corruption of the environment in which the manager
operates. Along the lines of the World Bank’s definition of corruption, we regard corruption as the
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abuse of public office for private gain—to be more precise, in this case, the abuse of a managerial
position for private gain, within a company with tight political connections. However, we provide
a specific characterization of a corrupt environment, which we believe is an accurate, yet often
overlooked by the literature, representation of the incentives involved. In a corrupt environment,
the manager, while in charge, reaps substantial private benefits from devoting his time to activities
that have no effect (neither positive nor negative) on the productivity of the company. Examples of
these unproductive activities (in the company’s perspective) include helping out the politician in
her re-election bid, or spending time meeting politicians or businessmen to build personal networks.
Private returns from such activities arise in part immediately and in part in the long run, after the
manager’s tenure at the company ends. Their extent is determined by the level of corruption of the
environment. Our interpretation of the notion of corruption stresses its geographic dimension, as it is
the organization of the market at the local level—that is local institutions (e.g., relevance of informal
networks, prevalence of non-market transactions)—that determines the rewards for unproductive
activities, and, as a result, the incentives to managerial efficiency. Corruption in our model does
not directly damage the firm. That notwithstanding, our characterization implies that the higher
the level of corruption, the more the scarce managerial time (or, equivalently, the scarce managerial
attention) will be diverted away from productivity-enhancing managerial tasks. The qualitative
result of our analysis would persist, even if we assumed a direct negative impact of the manager’s
unproductive activity.
We first model the relation between productivity, voters’ information, and the presence of a corrupt
environment, using a standard career concern approach to political agency. The fact that more voters’
information is associated with a higher productivity of the public service is well-known [4–7]. It results
from the interplay of two factors: each manager puts in more effort, and, on average, more talented
managers are selected. We enrich this standard setting, by explicitly introducing corruption into it.
We show that by holding voters’ information constant, a corrupt environment distorts managerial
effort incentives, leading to an increase in the extent of inefficiency. While voters’ information and
corruption operate through two different channels—the former reduces overall managerial effort,
and the latter diverts it away from efficiency maximization—for both variables, our model predicts an
association with efficiency. Hence, our testable implication is that inefficiency is greater for utilities
located in more corrupted regions, as well as in regions with low voters’ information.
We test these predictions using a rich unique micro-dataset on the solid waste collection and
disposal activity in Italy, which includes more than five hundred municipalities observed in the years
2004–2006. We use a stochastic cost frontier approach to analyze the effects of voters’ information and
of a corrupt environment on the costs of providing municipal solid waste (MSW) services. We proxy
voters’ information by newspapers’ readership, while we measure the extent of corruption of the
environment by the number of criminal charges against the State, public governments, and social
institutions. The empirical evidence supports our predictions. We find that both voters’ information
and corruption have a separate impact, in the expected direction, on the costs of MSW services.
Moreover, by enriching our cost frontier specification, we obtain some interesting additional insights.
In particular, we find that the impact of voters’ information on reducing inefficiency is smaller, or even
disappears, when municipalities organize the service in-house, or join an inter-municipal consortium,
while operating in a corrupt area is less detrimental to efficiency when municipalities are ruled by
left-wing parties.
The relationship between voters’ information and the performance of local public governments
has rarely been investigated empirically. An exception is Giordano and Tommasino [8], who identify
the determinants of public sector efficiency of the Italian local governments. They show that measures
of citizens’ political engagement (electoral turnout for referenda and number of newspapers sold) have
a positive and significant impact on the efficiency of the provision of local public services, such as
education, civil justice, health-care, and waste disposal, while measures of social capital do not have
any discernible effect. They do not consider the impact of a corrupt environment.
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The negative incidence of corruption on efficiency is well documented. Most of the empirical
literature relies on cross-country comparisons, and makes use of country-level measures of corruption
such as the Transparency International Index or the Corruption Perception index, while very few
papers use disaggregated data at the firm or at the local government level. For instance, Dal Bò
and Rossi [9] estimate a labor requirement function on a set of 80 electricity distribution firms active
in 13 Latin America countries, and show that firms operating in more corrupt environments tend
to be less efficient in terms of labor use. Yan and Oum [10] provide a single-country firm level
study. They investigate the effect of a corrupt environment on the cost efficiency of a sample of
55 US commercial airports observed from 2001 to 2009, and find a detrimental effect of corruption on
efficiency. Moreover, airports tended to contract out a larger set of activities to replace in-house labor
under more corrupt environments.
Some scholars investigate the role of information on corruption. For example, DiRienzo et al. [11]
found that for a sample of 85 countries, the use of information and communication technologies
by citizens is negatively related to a country’s Corruption Perception Index. More recently, Jha and
Sarangi [12] updated such an analysis by including a proxy for the use of social media, finding that for
a sample of 150 countries, Facebook penetration has a negative impact on corruption, especially for
countries with low press freedom.
Our paper is the first to analyze, theoretically and empirically, whether both channels (a corrupt
environment and voters’ information) matter separately in determining the efficiency level of politically
connected businesses.
Waste collection is a particularly suitable sector for our analysis. In Italy, waste collection and
disposal are mainly carried out by publicly-owned firms under the control of local governments,
and ultimately, of citizens. Although the latter should be, in principle, interested in the efficient
management of mandated tasks, due to the impact this would have on the tax burden, the assumptions
that they have complete information about the technology and that they are able to make an informed
assessment of the economic performance seem quite unreasonable. This is especially true in contexts
plagued by situations of widespread corruption and the entrenched presence of criminal organizations.
The entry of organized crime in the waste cycle is mainly aimed at creating shadow circuits for illegal
transport and disposal. In this context, the diffusion of collusive relationships among managers and
suppliers aimed at overcharging the firms, and at seeking illegal sources of profits is an uncontested
matter of fact [13]. Also, in more corrupt environments, managers are more likely to engage in
negotiating activities with local governments in order to establish more favorable tariffs and service
obligations, thereby diverting the managerial efforts away from cost monitoring and productive tasks.
Finally, some recent cases of bad MSW management have emerged as being topical. The media have
widely reported on the recent waste crisis in Naples and its surrounds, while a number of books
and movies have clearly informed about the connection between waste management and illegal
practices. Among the latter, the best-seller book Gomorrah [14] reached a large international audience
and contributed to sensitize the public opinion against the plague of environmental crimes. This paper
also contributes to the literature that suggests new governance models of public entities, and new laws
to reinforce the need to change the management model of public services [15,16]. As suggested by
Popescu et al. [16] in their analysis of the shadow economy in Romania: “Policy makers need to focus on
building reliable and transparent institutions with a lower level of corruption, regulations, and bureaucracy,
regaining people’s confidence in public institutions, and elaborating effective strategies for tackling the undeclared
activities that will contribute to the achievement of sustainable development desideratum”.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical analysis.
Section 3 describes the main features of the dataset, presents the econometric model, and shows the
main results of the estimates. Section 4 contains our concluding remarks.
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2. The Model
We model a MSW service operated by a company that is tightly linked to politics. We capture
this notion by assuming that the manager of the firm is selected by the political party in power.
In our environment, politicians, after selecting the manager, are unable to motivate him through
incentive-based remuneration schemes. In addition, the managers’ careers are tied to politicians in
power, in the sense that managers are reappointed whenever the politician in power is re-elected,
and replaced whenever the incumbent politician is ousted; politicians are prevented from firing a
manager that they have appointed, because firing a manager is administratively complicated and
costly. This is reflective of the Italian organization of the MSW sector. Waste services are typically
operated by municipality-owned companies, which adopt a spoils system, whereby managers are
replaced when the political majority changes. For example, Letizia Moratti (a center-right mayor
of Milan in the 2006–2011 time period) fired several municipal managers and replaced them with
high-wage external consultants. When Giuliano Pisapia (center-left party) replaced Moratti as mayor
of Milan, he in turn fired the ATM (the local bus and metro company) top management. In the same
vein, after recent Italian local elections, the mayors of Rome and Naples fired several top managers
and chairmen in charge of local public services, such as water distribution and bus transport.
Each manager operates in an environment that is characterized by a certain degree of corruption.
In corrupt environments, managers are privately rewarded for engaging in a range of activities that
provide no value to the firm [9].
2.1. Setting
We analyze a political/managerial agency model with elections, in which agents are infinitely
lived and discount the future at a rate δ ∈ [0; 1]. There is a representative risk-neutral voter. Her utility
is inversely related to the costs of the MSW operator, which is covered by a subsidy assumed to be
funded through taxation. For simplicity, while multiple policy issues enter voters’ consideration,
we restrict attention to the single issue of managerial performances, to illustrate how managerial effort
is shaped by electoral concerns.
Managers are career-concerned, and have a fixed per period reward R, which does not depend on
effort. The task of the manager consists of minimizing the cost borne by the firm. We denote as θt the
value that the manager provides to the company in time t. In particular, θ measures how much the
manager is able to reduce the cost, with respect to a benchmark. In what follows, with a slight abuse
of definition, we will designate θ as managerial productivity. θt depends both on managerial talent
ηt, and on how much effort he puts into managing the company (which we designate as productive
effort), denoted apt , according to the following relation:
θt = ηt + a
p
t (1)
Besides exerting effort into productivity-enhancing activity ap, the manager also can exert effort
in an activity that, while potentially generating a private benefit for the manager, has no direct impact,
either positive or negative, on the firm’s performance. This effort, which we designate as unproductive
(having in mind the perspective of the company), is denoted au. Effort in unproductive activity
generates a marginal return τa to the manager (while generating a null return for the company).
τa thus measures how rewarding distorting effort away from the productive activity is; when τa = 0,
the effort distortion is not rewarding at all. Hence, we regard τa as a measure of the level of corruption
in the institutional environment in which the firm operates, in a way that is similar to [9]. To keep
things simple, we assume that all the managers, irrespective of their talent, have the same return from
the unproductive activity. Managers keep devoting their effort to unproductive activity, and benefiting
from it, even once they are ousted from the firm. This reflects the notion that, in a corrupt environment,
managerial positions in politically-related companies allow for the development of long-term links
and networks that can be exploited, even after the manager loses his job [17]. However, we assume
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that the returns from au when the manager is ousted from his job, denoted τβ, are potentially lower
than when the manager is in charge, so that τβ ≤ τa. A manager that has lost his job, and thus has
ap = 0, R = 0, but au ≥ 0.
A manager is appointed by the politician when he enters office for the first time, and holds his
post until the politician is ousted from power. As illustrated above, this reflects the incentives that
are involved in the Italian institutional setting in the MSW collection sector in the 2004–2006 period.
Politicians, in this model, only play the role of selecting managers. The model thus revolves around
the manager. The managerial talent ηt evolves over time according to the following relation:
ηt = ρt − 1 + ρt (2)
where ρt − 1 and ρt (which we will refer to as period-specific skills) are i.i.d. random shocks,
and ρ ∼ N(ρ, σ2ρ ).
In this formulation (see also [18,19]), managerial ability changes gradually over time, capturing the
notion that firms operate in a dynamic environment, which requires continuously evolving skills for
the manager. It follows that we can rewrite:
θt = ρt−1 + ρt + a
p
t (3)
The time-line is as follows. In stage one, at the beginning of each period t, the t − 1 specific skill
ρt − 1 for the incumbent manager becomes common knowledge. However, before exerting efforts a
p
t
and aut , the manager does not fully know his talent. In particular, he is unaware of the period t-specific
skill, ρt. There is no asymmetric information in this model; in period t, both the manager and the voter
know ρt − 1, but neither the manager nor the voter know ρt. At stage two, the voter observes the same
noisy signal of managerial productivity:
θˆt = ηt + a
p
t + εt (4)
where εt is an i.i.d. shock N (0; σ2ε ), uncorrelated with talent. The voter observes the same signal
θˆt. The variance of the noise σ2ε reflects the extent of imprecision in the observability of managerial
behavior. A high σ2ε thus indicates less voter’s information on managerial behavior. The voter uses
θˆt to make her own inference on the level of the time-specific skill ρˆt. In period t + 1, the managerial
competence is ρt + ρt + 1. Thus, the voter’s expectation on the level of managerial competence at time
t + 1, in case the incumbent manager is reappointed, is ρˆt + ρ, where the unconditional expectation
ρ is the best predictor of ρt + 1. If, instead, a new manager is appointed at t + 1, both ρt and ρt + 1 are
randomly drawn; in this case, the best predictor at time t of a new manager’s competence at t + 1 is 2ρ.
At stage three, elections are held, pitting the incumbent politician to a randomly drawn challenger.
The voter recognizes that the fate of the manager is tied to that of the politician. She thus re-elects
the incumbent politician if the manager he is associated to is, in expectation, more skilled than the
manager linked to the challenger, which occurs if ρˆt > ρ.
2.2. Equilibrium Effort and Selection
We solve for the rational-expectation stationary equilibrium of this dynamic game. First, we find
the conditions under which the representative voter confirms the politician (and, as consequence,
the manager), by taking into consideration that only the noisy managerial productivity signal θˆt is
observed, and therefore by solving a standard signal extraction problem. Second, we find the optimal
effort choices apt and a
u
t of the manager, by assuming that the manager’s cost is a convex function of
the sum of the efforts put in the two (productive and unproductive) tasks: C(at) = 0.5 (a
p
t + a
u
t )
2. Finally,
we solve for the expected managerial productivity E(θt) = E(ηt) + a
p
t . The full details of the model are
available in the working paper version of this paper [20]. The results are summarized in the following:
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Proposition. The expected managerial productivity (weakly) decreases when the environment is more corrupt
(i.e., when the parameters τa and τβ increase). Also, it declines when the voter has less precise information
(i.e., high σ2ε ).
The result that voter’s information reduces managerial productivity is consonant with results on
the positive relation between observability and political efficiency [4–7]. Observe that both low voter’s
information and the presence of a corrupt environment are associated with a decline in managerial
productivity. However, they operate through two distinct mechanisms: low voter’s information
(higher variance σ2ε of the noise) entails a reduction in the total effort that is put in by the manager,
while a corrupt environment induces a diversion of the effort away from the productive activity.
This stems from our assumed convexity of the cost function in the sum of the effort in the productive
and in the unproductive activity. In turn, convexity follows from our characterization of corruption as
a geographic phenomenon, related to local institutions, which provide the politician with incentives
on the use of his scarce managerial time (or, equivalently, scarce managerial attention). We therefore
regard a corrupt environment as one in which a lot of rent dissipation occurs, in particular in terms of
managerial time and effort that are dissipated into an activity that has no effect on the company. Finally,
voters’ information has an impact on managerial-expected talent. More informed voters are better at
replacing untalented managers. On the other hand, the level of corruption of the environment has no
effect on this. Managers differ only with the dimension of talent for the productive activity. A corrupt
environment in our model does not affect the pool of talent, nor the precision of the signal obtained by
voters. In addition, the voter perfectly predicts the effort-diversion effect due to corruption. Hence,
her screening capacity is unaffected by the level of corruption.
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1. The Econometric Model
As highlighted by Narbón-Perpiña and De Witte in their recent review [21,22], the literature is rich
in empirical studies that have a main focus on the evaluation of efficiency in local governments.
The majority of works analyze cross-sectional data and use nonparametric tools such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Moreover, some studies focus on a specific local service, such as
refuse collection and disposal [23,24], while other studies refer to a wide range of services and facilities
that are offered by municipalities [25].
We recognize that there have been big developments in the use of nonparametric techniques.
Indeed, recent advanced robust nonparametric efficiency measures, order-m frontiers [26] and order-α
quantile type frontiers [27], as well as DEA panel data estimation techniques, have overcome the main
drawbacks of traditional nonparametric efficiency estimators [24,28]. This notwithstanding, we test
our theoretical predictions that costs are greater for utilities located in more corrupt regions, and in
regions where voters are less well-informed, by adopting a stochastic cost frontier approach.
The econometric model can be expressed in general terms as:
lnTCit = c(yit, pit; β) + uit + vit
uit ∼ N+
(
µ(zit; δ), σ2u
)
vit ∼ N
(
0, σ2ν
) (5)
where TCit is the total cost that is incurred by municipality i at time t, yit is a vector of outputs,
pit is a vector of input prices, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, vit is a standard error term
measuring random noise, and uit is a non-negative error term, to be interpreted as cost inefficiency.
The latter follows a truncated normal distribution whose pre-truncation mean is parameterized
on a set of exogenous factors zit—such as our key variables of interest, voters’ information,
and corruption—and a vector of parameters δ to be estimated. The two sets of parameters (β and
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δ) are estimated simultaneously. This is what is referred to as a one-step procedure, as opposed to
a two-step approach, which consists of estimating cost inefficiency without including exogenous
factors, and subsequently fitting a model in which a set of variables is used to explain the estimated
inefficiency. Some authors [29,30] suggest the adoption of a linear specification of the mean value of
the inefficiency term:
µit = δ0 + z′itδ (6)
Given the sign of δ parameters, a variation of z variables changes the mean of the pre-truncated
distribution of uit, thus allowing for an increase/decrease of the estimated cost inefficiency, in line with
our theoretical model. In principle, other possibilities would be feasible to analyze the impact of social
environment characteristics on the level of costs. An alternative would be, for instance, the inclusion
of a set of environmental features zit directly in c(yit, pit, zit; β), thus allowing for a modification of its
shape. This option is, however, not appropriate, given our purposes, since it assumes that the social
characteristics of the operating environment do not impact directly on the efforts of the municipalities,
or on their negotiation capabilities.
Cost inefficiency cannot be simply derived as a residual, since the composite error includes the
statistical noise vit term, which is not observable. Jondrow et al. [31], therefore, suggest to estimate uit
as its conditional expectation
_
u it, given the fitted value of εit = uit + vit, i.e.,
_
u it = E(uit|εit). The latter
can then be transformed into a measure of distance from the optimal frontier, following Battese and
Coelli [32], who define the cost inefficiency measure, CIit, as:
CIit = E(euit |εit) (7)
Inefficiency values are greater than (or equal to) one, and they are readily interpretable as
percentage deviations from the minimum attainable cost. Given that the expected inefficiency
(i.e., the mean of the pre-truncated distribution) is modeled as a function of a set of variables z,
the effect of such variables on the estimated cost inefficiency index depends on the features of the
truncated normal distribution. In general, their marginal effect on cost efficiency CE (i.e., the inverse of
cost inefficiency, ranging from 0 to 1) may be computed as:
∂CE
∂z
=
(
1−_γ
)

ϕ
(
µ∗
σ∗ −σ∗
)
e(−µ
∗+ 12 σ∗2)
σ∗Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
) − Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗ −σ∗
)
ϕ
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
e(−µ
∗+ 12 σ∗2)
σ∗
(
Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
))2 +
−Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗ −σ∗
)
e(−µ
∗+ 12 σ∗2)
Φ
(
µ∗
σ∗
)
 ∂µ∂z′ (8)
where Φ(.) and ϕ denote the cumulative distribution function and the density function of the standard
normal distribution, µ∗ =
(
1−_γ
)
_
µ +
_
γ
_
ε , σ∗ =
√
_
γ
(
1−_γ
)
_
σ ,
_
σ =
_
σ u +
_
σ v,
_
γ =
_
σ u
_
σ
,
_
σ u is the
estimated value of the standard deviation of the inefficiency term,
_
σ v is the estimated value of the
standard deviation of random noise,
_
ε is the estimated value of the composed error term (
_
ε =
_
u +
_
v ),
and
_
µ is the estimated expected value of the truncated distribution of the inefficiency term, based on
the δ parameters [33]. The marginal effects that are calculated at the individual observation level
measure the (monotonic) variation in the cost efficiency index with respect to a contour change of the
z variable.
3.2. Data and Variables
The database, which can be considered as being fairly representative of the entire population of
Italian municipalities, refers to a balanced panel of 529 municipalities (of which 204 are localized in
the north; 207 are localized in the south, and the remaining 118 are localized in the center of Italy)
observed over the period 2004–2006. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables included
in the cost frontier specification. For each municipality, we observe:
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4775 8 of 22
- the total cost (TC), which is the sum of labor, capital, and fuel costs that are incurred to provide
the MSW service;
- the tons of MSW disposed (yD);
- the tons of MSW sent for recycling (yR);
- the price of labor (pL), given by the ratio of the total salary expenses to the number of full-time
equivalent employees;
- the price of diesel fuel (pF);
- the price of capital (pk), obtained by dividing the depreciation costs by the capital stock.
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. Min Max
TC Total cost (000 €) 5436 23,965 46 48,065
yD Waste disposed (t) 17,125 71,195 118.44 1,462,128
yR Waste recycled (t) 3770 13,044 8.86 210,211
pL Price of labor (€/employee) 36,394 5744 21,000 62,613
pK Price of capital (depreciation rate) 0.087 0.013 0.049 0.124
pF Price of diesel fuel (€/liter) 1.023 0.122 0.780 1.370
DEN Population density (inhabitants per square km) 903 1241 22 9441
TOUR Beds in tourist accommodation per 100,000 inhab. 1939 7127 1 127,983
CORP Limited responsibility company (dummy) 0.819 0.386 0 1
HOUSE In-house provision (dummy) 0.100 0.300 0 1
INTMUN Inter-municipal partnership (dummy) 0.081 0.273 0 1
LWPOL Left-wing political orientation (dummy) 0.287 0.453 0 1
RWPOL Right-wing political orientation (dummy) 0.178 0.383 0 1
CIVIC Civic or municipal lists (dummy) 0.534 0.499 0 1
VOTINFO Newspaper readers (per 1000 inhabitants) 351 105 148 599
CORRUPT Crimes against public faith (per 100,000 inhab.) 5.492 1.819 1.703 15.113
LATIT Latitude coordinate 42.524 2.661 35.503 46.610
LONGIT Longitude coordinate 12.413 2.789 7.333 18.377
GDP Per-capita value added 21,782 7,014 11,639 36,542
We merged different sources of data. Data on costs and output quantities were obtained from
annual MUDs (i.e., annual declarations concerning municipal solid waste collection), and these were
provided by Ecocerved, a limited consortium company that is owned by the Italian Chambers of
Commerce, which collects and elaborates data on waste management. The fact that we are able to
observe the total cost of the integrated waste cycle at the municipality level is a clear strength of our
paper. While we have balance sheet-data (in the case in which the service is managed by a limited
liability company) and information about the costs of the waste collection service (in the cases of
in-house provision or inter-municipal consortia), we used them only for double checking, in the
few cases in which Ecocerved data were missing or incomplete. Input prices have been computed
by integrating the information available in the MUDs, with additional information drawn from
questionnaires sent to the firms (or internal organizational structures of the municipalities, in case of
in-house provision) managing the service in the municipalities. As an exception, the price of diesel
fuel was drawn from data released by the local Chambers of Commerce.
Table 1 shows that the average municipality produces almost 21,000 tons of waste: 17,125 tons are
disposed (to landfills or incinerators), and only 3770 are sent to recycling (around 18 per cent of the
total waste). The average cost per ton is in the neighborhood of 260 euros.
Our database also includes information about the population density and the impact of tourism
in the various municipalities. Population density is obtained by dividing the local population for the
municipality’s area. The information about the impact of tourism has been drawn from the National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), and is represented by the number of beds in tourism accommodation
structures per 100,000 inhabitants. Both these variables are expected to be increase costs. Tourism is
usually associated with seasonal variations, and it tends to increase the complexity of the service.
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As for the density, it may be considered as a proxy of the frequency of the service. It may be expected,
in fact, that the more densely populated areas are characterized by a more accentuated saturation
rate of the collection points, and they therefore need more structurally frequent passages to collect
waste. We also gathered information concerning the organizational structure of the MSW service
as well as the political orientation of the municipality. The limited liability company is by far the
most popular legal form (82 percent of the entire sample), followed by in-house provision (10 percent)
and inter-municipal partnership (8 percent). The political environment is captured by data on the
political majorities ruling the municipalities. Data indicate that left-wing parties are governing around
29 percent of municipalities, right-wing parties around 18 percent, and “civic or municipal lists”,
that is, independent local political groups which are not affiliated to major nation-wide left wing
or right-wing parties, the remaining 53 percent. Additional control variables are the localization of
municipalities in terms of geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude), and the GDP, measured at
the province-level.
Finally, the cornerstone of the analysis is related to the measurement of voters’ information
(VOTINFO) and the level of corruption of the environment. We proxy voters’ information by
newspapers diffusion (as in [34]). The data were drawn from Audipress, an organization monitoring
newspapers data in Italy, and refer to the number of readers of the most popular newspapers in the
province for every 1000 inhabitants (i.e., newspapers whose circulation exceeds 50,000 copies). In the
statistics, therefore, both local and national newspapers are included. This indicator is available only
at the province-level of disaggregation; thus, we associated each municipality to its provincial value.
This seems to be a reasonable degree of approximation, given that the average dimension of an Italian
province is quite small (around 2700 km2 and 500,000 inhabitants). Moreover, in our dataset, there is a
total of 101 provinces (out of 110); thus, a suitable degree of cross-section variability is ensured.
A crucial point of the analysis clearly concerns the complex assessment of the level of corruption of
the environment. As argued by Golden and Picci [35], directly measuring corruption is “an enterprise
that is not possible since corruption is a complex set of variable interactions, processes and phenomena
with no single metric”. (p. 37). Moreover, since the most commonly used measures are based on
corruption perceptions, more effort should be put in constructing more objective corruption indices,
which could produce more reliable results: “Perceptions data should be used for empirical research on
the determinants of corruption with considerable caution, and there is little alternative to continuing to
collect more objective measures of corruption, difficult though that may be” [36] (p. 962). Our preferred
measure uses publicly available data from the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). In particular,
CORRUPT indicates the number of criminal charges against the State, public governments and social
institutions (per 100,000 inhabitants), and consists of an aggregate indicator that includes crimes such
as embezzlement, extortion, conspiracy, and other crimes against faith and public order. CORRUPT
is available at provincial level and it is time-invariant, since we consider the average number of
crimes during the period 2004–2006. This measure, which has been used in [37], does not reflect
actual corruption crimes, but only the crimes reported to the police, and hence it has the drawback
of underestimating the true phenomenon. As a robustness check, we use also the corruption index
proposed by [35], which is based on the difference between the cumulative amount of resources
devoted to public works in each province and the physical quantities of infrastructures actually
realized. This “missing expenditure” index, which has been widely used in the literature [7,38],
is similar to the one computed by [36], who compared the amount of money spent for road-building
projects in Indonesian villages with an independent estimate of the actual cost of project realization
provided by a team of engineers. The results are very similar.
Jha and Panda [39] stressed the role of cultural norms in determining corruption.
In particular, they investigated on a large cross-section of countries the relationship between
the individualism/collectivism of citizens, and the perceived corruption level. Others cultural
aspects are power distance (unequal distribution of power), masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance
(unwillingness to challenge authority and rules in cases of high uncertainty) [11]. The main
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findings of such studies are that countries with high levels of feminine cultural values and
individualism (i.e., a belief system in which individual achievement is ideal) are less prone to
corruption, while masculine societies and collectivist countries are more conducive to nepotism
and favoritism. We recognize that culture is an important determinant of corruption, and we are
indebted to an anonymous referee for having raised this issue. Unfortunately, we are not able to
include cultural measures as controls, given the unavailability of reliable proxies at the municipal or
provincial level.
3.3. The Cost Frontier Specification
In order to identify the relationship between cost efficiency in the collection of solid waste and
corruption, we need to parameterize the stochastic cost frontier. A popular functional form in this type
of studies is the translog function, that is, a second-degree Taylor approximation of an arbitrary cost
function. In our case, we specify a two-output, three-input cost frontier, taking the following form:
ln
(
TCit
pFit
)
= β0 + ∑
r∈(D,R)
βr ln yr + ∑
s∈(L,K)
βs ln
(
ps
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)
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∑
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∑
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)
ln
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pFit
)
+ βDEN DENit + βTOURTOURit + uit + vit
(9)
The residual is composed of a one-sided (uit) term, which follows a truncated normal distribution
with mean µit, and a symmetric random noise (vit). We further assume that vit and uit are homoskedastic
and independent of each other, and uncorrelated with the output and input price vectors, yr and ps.
The outputs yr are represented by the volume of MSW disposed (r = D), and the volume of MSW
recycled (r = R). On the side of productive factors, prices refers to labor (s = L), capital (s = K), and fuel
(s = F).
The cost and input prices are divided by the price of fuel (pF) to ensure a homogeneity of degree
one in input prices, while βsr = βrs and βsm = βms impose symmetry. Other non-imposed properties,
in particular, concerning the concavity of the cost function in input prices, are checked ex post.
We model the expected value of the pre-truncation normal distribution of cost inefficiency
in accordance to the theoretical predictions derived in Section 2. In particular, we test three
subsequent models:
Model 1:
µit = δ0 + δVOT ln VOTINFOit + δCORRln CORRUPTit (10)
Model 2:
µit = δ0 + ln VOTINFOit(δVOT + δVOT_CORPCORPit)
+ln CORRUPTit(δCORR + δCORR_LW LWPOLit) + δCORPCORPit + δLW LWPOLit
(11)
Model 3:
µit = δ0 + ln VOTINFOit(δVOT + δVOT_CORPCORPit)
+ln CORRUPTit(δCORR + δCORR_LW LWPOLit) + δCORPCORPit + δLW LWPOLit
+δSSOUTHi + δN NORTHi + δLONGLONGITi + δLAT LATITi + δGDPGDPit + δTTIMEt
(12)
Following the indications from the theoretical model developed in Section 2, Model 1 sets the
municipality inefficiency as a function of voters’ information and corruption. Model 2 enriches
the analysis using additional variables that can impact on the way in which voters’ information or
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corruption are affecting the efficient provision of MSW services. More specifically, it emphasizes
the potential interactions between voters’ information and the organizational form of service supply,
on the one hand, and corruption and political orientation on the other. First, we control for the
type of service organization, by adding a dummy identifying municipalities that manage the service
through limited responsibility companies (CORP). This type of ownership may directly impact on
efficiency, even though empirical evidence in this sense is rather mixed [40]. Furthermore, if the
potential impact of voters’ information varies across different types of service organizations, we may
observe an additional indirect effect through the parameter δVOT_CORP. The underlying assumption is
that the efficiency benefits from higher voters’ information may be diluted, or even disappear when
services are not provided through a limited liability company (the only one subject to the private law
administrative and accounting rules). For instance, under an in-house provision, a municipality could
use cross-subsidization strategies within the broad municipal budget, which can make it particularly
challenging for an observer to assess the actual cost, and hence the actual efficiency, of the service. In a
similar vein, for associative consortia, it is more difficult to disentangle the responsibilities of each
municipality in the case of poor performance in the management of the service.
The second control concerns the type of political leadership in the local councils, measured by the
dummy variable LWPOL. In this case, as well, the political variable is included by itself and in terms
of interaction with the level of corruption. The underlying ideas is that local administrations animated
by a left-wing political orientation might be more spending-oriented, but at the same time they may
be less affected by distorting corruption effects (δCORR_LW is expected to exhibit a negative sign).
To that regard, Hessami [41] finds cross-country evidence that corruption in the public sector is more
likely to prevail when right-wing parties are in power. She interprets her results by considering that:
“members of right-wing parties are more likely to originate from an entrepreneurial background and
their party platforms more strongly represent the interests of businessmen” (p. 2), so that they often
(more often than left-wing politicians) end up in a trustful, reciprocal relationship with representatives
of the private sector, a link that can also be used to foster illegal activities such as corruption. Moreover,
Jimenez and Garcia [42] find that, in a large sample of Spanish municipalities, after a politician is
involved in a local corruption case, the voting share of left-wing parties is reduced by 2–3 percentage
points, while right-wing coalitions even increase their share in subsequent elections. Therefore,
right-wing voters appear to be much more loyal than left-wing voters, so that left-wing parties
have much more to lose if they are caught being involved in corruption activities. Finally, Model 3
adds several control variables in the mean inefficiency ancillary equation, as a further robustness check
on the key interest parameters. In particular, the presence of a geographical effect is captured both
by means of two macro-area dummies (NORTH and SOUTH) and by the exact latitude (LATIT) and
longitude (LONGIT) coordinates of each municipality. In addition, we account for the time trend
(TIME) and the GDP per capita of the province, a control that is meant to proxy for shocks that could
affect simultaneously corruption and efficiency.
Our selection of the explanatory variables to be included in this study is partially due to data
limitation, and partially to the previous experience that we have accumulated on estimating the costs
of local public services [3,43,44]. We are confident that our specification, while being parsimonious,
includes the most relevant factors that can have an impact on the costs of collecting solid waste. Da Cruz
and Marquez [45] argued that the inclusion of environmental factors in empirical efficiency analyses of
local governments often lacks structure, and they tried to identify the variables that are associated to
better/worse performance. In doing so, they provided a taxonomy of the various types of variables
to facilitate and structure the interpretation of the empirical results. Our list of explanatory variables
includes most of the categories highlighted by the authors, namely natural determinants (TOUR,
LONGIT, LATIT), citizen-related determinants (GDP, VOTINFO, DEN), institutional determinants
(LWPOL, RWPOL, CIVIC, CORP, HOUSE, INTMUN).
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3.4. Results
The one-step total cost frontier (9), combined with the inefficiency model (10) or (11) or (12),
is estimated by using the maximum likelihood technique. As a normalization strategy, we have divided
all continuous variables (cost, output, input price, voters’ information, and corruption measures) by
their sample geometric mean. This allows for the direct interpretation of first-order parameters
as cost elasticities at the local approximation point. Table 2 displays the estimated parameters.
All first-order parameters of the cost frontier are strongly significant, and they have the expected
positive sign. Output parameters βD and βR indicate that a 1% increase in MSW disposed or MSW
sent to recycling results, ceteris paribus, in a 0.721 to 0.750% or 0.198 to 0.221% increase in costs,
respectively. Scale economies at the sample mean can be computed as the inverse of the sum of output
elasticities. In this case, the adopted two-output cost frontier specification yields values at around unity
in all of the models, thus suggesting that the average municipality exhibits constant returns to scale.
The estimates of labor and capital price elasticities are given by the parameters βL and βK. According to
Shephard’s lemma, they equal the optimal labor and capital cost shares at the local approximation
point. The share of the factor (i.e., fuel) that is used as numeraire can then be obtained residually.
All of the three models estimate a labor cost share (between 39% and 43%) that is higher than the
capital cost share (between 16% and 23%), and about the same as the fuel cost share (between 35% and
45%). This seems reasonable and in line with the typical cost structure in this service. Second-order
parameters give flexibility to the functional form, allowing for a pointwise estimate of the output and
input price elasticities. In particular, the parameter βDR is negative and significant, suggesting cost
complementarities in the joint provision of disposal and recycling services. The specification of the
cost function is simple, but it contains all the relevant information to fit the precisely observed costs.
For more details concerning the technological features of MSW services see [43], which focuses on the
impact of different recycling shares on refusal collection costs, and provides a complete analysis of
scale and scope economies.
Table 2. Cost frontier estimates.
Variables Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
lnyD βD 0.750 *** 0.740 *** 0.721 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
lnyR βR 0.198 *** 0.200 *** 0.221 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
lnpL βL 0.434 *** 0.415 *** 0.388 ***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.054)
lnpK βK 0.200 *** 0.231 *** 0.164 ***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.048)
(lnyD)2 βDD 0.164 *** 0.164 *** 0.157 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
(lnyR)2 βRR 0.088 *** 0.087 *** 0.093 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
(lnpL)2 βLL −0.047 −0.141 0.070
(0.371) (0.368) (0.374)
(lnpK)2 βKK −1.113 *** −1.017 ** −0.620
(0.400) (0.399) (0.441)
(lnyD)(lnyR) βDR −0.111 *** −0.110 *** −0.109 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
(lnpL)(lnyD) βLD 0.047 0.050 0.028
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
(lnpL)(lnyR) βLR 0.028 0.043 0.042
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
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Table 2. Cont.
Variables Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(lnpL)(lnpK) βLK −0.140 −0.134 −0.256
(0.308) (0.307) (0.336)
(lnpK)(lnyD) βKD 0.031 0.027 −0.007
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
(lnpK)(lnyR) βKR −0.056 * −0.069 ** −0.033
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
lnDEN βDEN 0.077 *** 0.079 *** 0.071 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
lnTOUR βTUR 0.014 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant β0 −0.277 *** −0.299 *** −0.351 ***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.040)
Inefficiency model
lnVOTINFO δVOT −0.515 ** −0.060 0.028
(0.206) (0.101) (0.087)
CORP δCORP −0.135 ** −0.040
(0.064) (0.033)
lnVOTINFO × CORP δVOT_CORP −0.396 ** −0.259 ***
(0.182) (0.098)
lnCORRUPT δCORR 0.352 ** 0.389 *** 0.275 ***
(0.139) (0.131) (0.066)
LWPOL δLW 0.171 *** 0.115 ***
(0.060) (0.030)
lnCORRUPT × LWPOL δCORRLW −0.318 ** −0.221 ***
(0.136) (0.077)
SOUTH δS 0.249 ***
(0.064)
NORTH δN −0.218 ***
(0.062)
LONGIT δLONG −0.366 ***
(0.089)
LATIT δLAT 1.223 ***
(0.393)
GDP δGDP 0.001
(0.108)
TIME δT −0.051 ***
(0.017)
Constant δ0 −0.174 0.103 0.271 ***
(0.264) (0.131) (0.079)
Std. Dev. one-sided error term σU 0.288 *** 0.226 *** 0.173 ***
(0.064) (0.046) (0.039)
Std. Dev. two-sided error term σV 0.234 *** 0.232 *** 0.231 ***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Lambda λ 1.229 *** 0.973 *** 0.749 ***
(0.065) (0.050) (0.051)
Log-Likelihood Function −213.537 −195.575 −161.686
Likelihood Ratio test 103.70 *** 67.78 ***
Number of observations 1587 1587 1587
Statistically significant at 1% ***, 5% **, 10% *, standard errors in round brackets.
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Turning to cost inefficiency, Table 2 shows that the coefficient δVOT in Model 1 is negative and
highly statistically significant. A greater propensity to participation by citizens—and therefore less
opacity in the relationship between citizens and decision-makers—can substantially reduce the cost
inefficiency. This is in line with [4], as well as with a large amount of anecdotal evidence pointing at the
notion that a greater pressure by public opinion is able to route managers and policy-makers towards
more efficient decisions. As expected, δCORR is instead positive, suggesting that more widespread
corruption negatively affects the efficiency performance of MSW services. On the whole, this lends
support to our theoretical section.
Model 2 explores in greater details the effects of voters’ information and corruption. In this case,
the parameter δVOT measures the impact of the degree of voters’ information in the base case in which
waste is collected directly by individual municipalities or through inter-municipal consortia, while the
parameter of the interacted term δVOT_CORP should be interpreted as the incremental effect due to the
presence of limited liability companies. By itself, the corporatization of waste collection generally
reduces cost inefficiency (δCORP = −0.135, p < 0.05). This result is in line with empirical evidence
about the positive effects of corporatization on the performance of local public services provision [44].
The marginal impact of voters’ information in the case of service supply through distinct business
organizations is significant (δVOT_CORP =−0.396), while δVOT is not statistically significant. This means
that voters’ information reduces the cost inefficiency, only if the service is managed through the
establishment of independent companies, while the presence of associations of municipalities or of
direct in-house management blur the potential benefits of a higher transparency.
Similarly, we analyze the differential prevalence of corruption across different political majorities.
The parameter δCORR_LW represents the incremental cost inefficiency due to corruption under left-wing
political guidance. In Model 2, δCORR still remains positive and highly statistically significant, while the
interaction term δCORR_LW is inefficiency-reducing. The resulting effect of corruption in municipalities
led by left-wing local councils is equal to 0.071, and it is significant. This implies that in municipalities
ruled by right-wing parties and by independent parties (“civic lists”), waste collection services suffer
more from cost inefficiency due to corruption. The behavior of left-wing municipal councils is,
however, more spending-oriented (δLW = 0.171, p < 0.01). In Model 3, all of the additional variables
that are included in the inefficiency model are significant, with the exception of GDP. The geographical
dummies confirm the well-known north–south division, suggesting higher (lower) refuse collection
costs for southern (northern) municipalities, while the time trend is negative and significant at the
1% level across all the models, indicating cost-reducing technological progress. Interesting enough,
the coefficient for LONGIT is negative, suggesting that, after having checked for the three macro
regions (north, center and south), eastern municipalities are associated with lower costs. This implies,
for example, that municipalities localized in the northeastern Veneto region (or Lazio and Apulia,
for center and south, respectively) are more efficient than municipalities that are localized in Piedmont
(Sardinia and Sicily, respectively). More importantly, the effects of corruption and voters’ information
are confirmed, even if the magnitude of coefficients reduces with respect to Model 2. The last rows
in Table 2 show the statistics for the λ coefficient, which is defined as the ratio between the standard
deviation of the inefficiency term σu and the standard deviation of random noise. The values are
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the inefficiency term has a significant contribution
on the total variation of the composed error. Then, the likelihood ratio tests of the unrestricted Model 3
(U) against the restricted (R) Models 1 and 2 indicate that including a large set of explanatory variables
of expected inefficiency would be preferable.
Using Equation (8), we compute the marginal effects on the estimated cost efficiency for our
preferred specification (Model 3). The results are displayed in Table 3, which provides a measure of the
marginal improvement in the efficiency level that can be achieved by reducing corruption or increasing
voters’ information.
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Table 3. Marginal effects on estimated cost efficiency (based on Model 3).
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Voters’ information 0.051 0.011 0.022 0.069
if CORP = 1
Corruption −0.042 0.022 −0.074 −0.006
if LWPOL = 1 −0.011 0.002 −0.014 −0.006
if LWPOL = 0 −0.054 0.012 −0.074 −0.023
The theoretical maximum cost efficiency (frontier level) is equal to 1: therefore, the efficiency
level can be also interpreted as the percentage of efficiency achieved with respect to the maximum.
Since the explanatory variables are in logarithm, the magnitude of the values in Table 3 can be
interpreted as follows. In the cases where the services are provided by limited liability companies,
increasing voters’ information by 10% would move the efficiency level towards the frontier by
approximately 0.5%. Furthermore, decreasing corruption by 10% would increase the efficiency level,
on average, by 0.42%, with a more remarkable impact for non-left-governed municipalities (0.54%).
While these figures describe the average impact, both effects tend to be more pronounced when the
estimated efficiency decreases.
3.5. Impact of Voters’ Information and Corruption on Costs
In this section, we provide evidence on the impact of voters’ information and corruption changes
on cost variation. Table 4 simulates the average cost change, due to the reduction or expansion of
voters’ information and corruption levels, respectively, up to the maximum/minimum level.
Table 4. Impact of voters’ information and corruption on costs (based on Model 3).
If CORP = 1 If LWPOL = 1 If LWPOL = 0
Average population 45,662 54,152 35,828
∆ corruption
(to minimum value)
Cost change (% variation) −0.016 −0.074
Cost change (million €) −0.1 −0.4
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) −1.91 −7.75
∆ corruption
(to maximum value)
Cost change (% variation) 0.016 0.075
Cost change (million €) 0.1 0.3
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) 1.93 7.66
∆ voters’ information
(to minimum value)
Cost change (% variation) 0.056
Cost change (million €) 0.4
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) 6.380
∆ voters’ information
(to maximum value)
Cost change (% variation) −0.036
Cost change (million €) −0.2
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) −3.878
Accordingly, a reduction in voters’ information to the minimum level results in a cost increase
of approximately 5.6% of the observed cost while expanding the level of voters’ information to the
maximum value (within the sample) would allow cost savings in the order of 3.6%, corresponding to
approximately 3.9 euros per inhabitant. If extended to the whole Italian population, this figure would
translate to total cost savings of almost 250 million euros. A more widespread level of corruption
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(to the maximum level) would increase costs by 1.6% in the presence of local governments leaning to
the left and by up to 7.5% in the group of non-left-wing observations. By contrast, programs aimed at
curbing corruption would allow, in the non-left-wing group, cost savings of up to 7.4%, corresponding
to approximately 7.8 euros per inhabitant. These figures are as almost four times those for the group of
municipalities ruled by left-wing political parties, and they corroborate previous evidence concerning
a lower permeability of the latter to the corruption plague.
Finally, Table 5 details cost simulations for a set of large municipalities (with more than
300,000 inhabitants).
Table 5. Impact of voters’ information and corruption on costs for some large municipalities (Model 3).
Rome Milan Turin Palermo Florence Bari
Average
population 2,711,491 1,297,244 910,437 662,046 366,074 321,747
Geographical
region Center North North South Center South
∆ corruption
(to minimum
value)
Cost change
(% variation) −0.073 −0.074 −0.036 −0.110 −0.059 −0.011
Cost change
(million €) −31.3 −19.2 −5.0 −11.3 −4.0 −0.5
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) −11.56 −14.83 −5.50 −17.12 −10.96 −1.64
∆ corruption
(to maximum
value)
Cost change
(% variation) 0.037 0.050 0.041 0.095 0.041 0.032
Cost change
(million €) 15.7 12.8 5.7 9.8 2.8 1.4
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) 5.77 9.85 6.29 14.81 7.66 4.45
∆ voters’ inform.
(to minimum
value)
Cost change
(% variation) 0.074 0.062 0.062 0.028 0.080 0.041
Cost change
(million €) 32.5 15.9 9.1 2.9 5.3 1.9
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) 11.99 12.24 10.00 4.34 14.57 5.84
∆ voters’ inform.
(to maximum
value)
Cost change
(% variation) −0.019 −0.020 −0.035 −0.091 −0.022 −0.084
Cost change
(million €) −8.5 −5.1 −5.2 −9.4 −1.5 −3.8
Cost change
(€ per inhabit.) −3.13 −3.91 −5.66 −14.18 −4.10 −11.92
With reference to the two most populated Italian cities, Rome and Milan, a large reduction in
the degree of corruption is expected to result in a relative cost saving of 7.3–7.4%, equivalent to
around 12–15 euros per inhabitant. Also, the second largest southern city, Palermo, looks like it would
be heavily affected by a hypothetical improvement in the degree of corruption. In the same vein,
an improvement in the level of voters’ information in the two most populous cities is shown to induce
a relative cost saving, ranging between 1.9% and 2%, which is equivalent to a saving of 3–4 euros per
inhabitant. The major benefit would concern, in this case, the Southern municipalities (Palermo and
Bari), which are generally plagued by less transparency in the decision-making process.
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3.6. Robustness Checks
In this section, we focus on the causality relation between inefficiency and corruption,
addressing the potential endogeneity problem arising from the model specification. First, we could
argue that using corruption data at the provincial level and municipal-level data from one particular
industry should reduce potential endogeneity problems [9]. In fact, while it is likely that existing
corruption in a province has an impact on the cost efficiency of a subset of firms, such as our waste
management providers, it is less likely that the inefficiency of the latter will affect the province’s overall
corruption level.
However, our corruption proxy might still capture the effect of some other omitted factors (such as,
for instance, the corruption crimes that are not reported to the police). For this reason, as a robustness
analysis, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy. Our instruments exploit the correlation between
history and institutional quality variables, such as corruption and voters’ information. The idea is
that some critical historical events (such as a foreign domination or the formation of civic traditions)
still matter for current institutional settings of a region (such as corruption), but they do not plausibly
influence current economic performance. The first set of instruments follows [46], who proposed a
9-scale measure of civic-ness of Italian provinces in the period between 1860 and 1920. In particular,
the index has been computed using data on membership in mutual aid societies and in cooperatives,
the strength of the mass parties, the turnout in the few open elections before the advent of Fascism,
and longevity of local cultural and recreational organizations. The second, alternative, instrument that
we use follows [47]. The authors analyze the link between institutional quality and the economic
performance of Italian provinces by using the histories of the different foreign dominations that ruled
Italian regions (in a time span of 700 years before the unification of Italy, which occurred in the late 19th
century) as instruments. We use two instruments, FORDOMyear and FORDOMs. FORDOMyear accounts
for the number of years during which each province has been ruled (the maximum value is for the
provinces controlled by the Papal State, who ruled for 700 years). FORDOMs accounts for the number
of different dominators that governed a specific province at different periods of time in the seven
centuries taken into consideration. In particular, it is constructed as a Krugman’s specialization index:
FORDOMs = ∑i |bi −
−
b |, where i identifies the nine possible dominations (the Normans, the Swabians,
the Anjou, the Aragonese, the Bourbons, the Papal State, the Savoy, the Austrians, and the Republic of
Venice), bi is the percentage of years that a specific dominator ruled a province (i.e., bi = total number
of years/700), and b is the average of b for all provinces. A high value of FORDOMs means that the
province has been ruled by the same regime for a long period of time, while a low value occurs if there
have been different dominations over the centuries.
The identification strategy employs a two-step approach to instrument corruption, taking Model
3 as the baseline and using alternatively, as first stage instruments, the Putnam’s scale of civic-ness
for the early unitary period and the type of historical dominations. In the second stage, the frontier
model includes, among the determinants of inefficiency, the fitted values of corruption instead of the
original values.
The estimates, shown in Table 6, confirm most of previously reported results. In particular,
the impact of corruption on inefficiency remains significant in all models, and the magnitude of the
coefficients is even higher than in Model 3 (at least for Model 4 when using Putnam’s civic-ness
indicators). This means that, if a problem of endogeneity due to omitted variable exists, it might go
in the direction of underestimating the effect of corruption. This result seems consistent with the
idea that the proposed measure of corruption (CORRUPT), based on reported corruption crimes only,
might partially underestimate the true phenomenon, and thus the cost benefits emerging from our
simulations might be regarded as conservative.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4775 18 of 22
Table 6. Instrumental variable estimates of the inefficiency model.
Variables Parameters Model 4 Model 5
Instruments:
Putnam civic-ness
Instruments:
Dominations (1100–1800)
Number of instruments: 8 Number of instruments: 2
lnVOTINFO δACC 0.025 −0.014
(0.063) (0.068)
CORP δCORP −0.015 −0.024
(0.022) (0.023)
lnVOTINFO × CORP δACC_CORP −0.173 *** −0.141 **
(0.064) (0.067)
lnCORRUPT δCORR 0.411 *** 0.200 **
(0.053) (0.081)
LWPOL δLW 0.084 *** 0.083 ***
(0.016) (0.017)
lnCORRUPT × LWPOL δCORRLW −0.431 *** −0.105
(0.080) (0.106)
SOUTH δS 0.199 *** 0.174 ***
(0.034) (0.036)
NORTH δN −0.115 *** −0.103 ***
(0.032) (0.035)
LONGIT δLONG −0.252 *** −0.207 ***
(0.056) (0.063)
LATIT δLAT 1.210 *** 1.305 ***
(0.272) (0.276)
GDP δGDP −0.004 −0.008
(0.055) (0.059)
TIME δT −0.038 *** −0.045 ***
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant δ0 0.193 *** 0.835 ***
(0.040) (0.038)
First stage F-statistic
(instruments only) (a)
F (8, 1568)
71.32
F (2, 1574)
77.82
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 1587 1587
Statistically significant at 1% ***, 5% **, standard errors in round brackets; (a) The F-statistic tests the validity of
instruments: the null hypothesis is that, respectively, Putnam civic-ness dummies and domination indexes are
jointly not significantly different from 0 in the first-stage regression. The F-statistic must be at least larger than 10 to
avoid the problem of weak instruments.
From a methodological point of view, the high value of the first stage F-statistic suggests that
both civic-ness and historical dominance are good instruments for corruption. In particular, as a
rule of thumb, one could say that an instrument is not weak when the F-statistic is larger than 10.
Actually, [48] develops more rigorous tables defining the critical minimum value of F, to avoid the
problem of weak instruments, depending on the number of instruments. In both Models 4 and 5,
the value of F is much larger then such critical values.
4. Conclusions
Politically connected public services providers may be less efficient than standard competitive
firms. The principals (voters) may observe the agents (the service provider managers) only very
imperfectly. In addition, the interaction between voters and managers is mediated by politicians,
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who act both as agents of the voters, and as principals of the public service providers. In this context,
managers have incentives to exploit the limited information on their behavior by the voters. They may
put in less effort, and exploit corruption opportunities, which may be particularly appealing to them,
due to their relations with the politicians.
The aim of this paper is to analyze both theoretically and empirically how voters’ information and
a corrupt environment impact on efficiency in the provision of a typical local public service, such as
solid waste collection and disposal.
On the theory side, we provide a novel characterization of a corrupt environment, stressing its
geographical dimension. We fit this into a standard career concern model. We show how the extent
of voters’ information and the level of corruption of the environment in which the manager operates
affect managerial effort. We do not model corruption as an activity that directly damages the firm;
our choice reflects the notion that managers respond to incentives to corruption, which are determined
by a geographical dimension. We find that inefficiency is larger for operators that are located in areas
where information on their performances is less precise. We also show that inefficiency is larger in
more corrupt environments, in which managers’ incentives are distorted towards activities that do not
benefit the company, while they are privately rewarding. We believe this reflects a common occurrence
in public companies with low-powered incentives.
Our theoretical predictions are tested using a rich dataset on solid waste management services
provided by Italian municipalities for the years 2004–2006, and using stochastic frontier analysis to
measure performance levels, in line with [49]. The results of our cost frontier estimates show that both
voters’ information, measured by newspapers’ readership, and corruption, measured using official data
about the criminal activity at provincial level, matter, and they exhibit a significant impact (negative for
corruption, positive for voters’ information) on efficiency levels. In addition, we show that the effect
of voters’ information declines or even disappears when municipalities provide the service in-house,
or by adhering to inter-municipal consortia, which appear to be less efficient ways of organizing
the activity, as compared to entrusting it to a limited liability company. Some authors contrast the
benefits of public services in-house provision versus their outsourcing through procurement contracts,
showing that procurement is preferable when the public sector employs too many workers and suffers
from patronage [50]. This is likely the case for the Italian public sector, and that is probably why the
service provided by limited liability companies in our sample exhibits superior efficiency with respect
to that provided in house. Finally, we find that, while municipalities that are ruled by left-wing parties
exhibit higher inefficiency levels, they are also those in which the impact of corruption on inefficiency
is lower. Our results are robust to the introduction of further explanatory variables of the mean value
of the inefficiency term, to the measurement of corruption through the missing-expenditure index
introduced by [35], and to the use of instrumental variables estimation.
Overall, our findings suggest that effective anti-corruption measures, and/or carefully designed
incentives for citizens to acquire information, can have substantial effects on the costs of collecting
solid waste, especially for the southern regions of the country. Our simulations for six Italian major
cities show that costs can decrease in the range of 1–11%, if corruption declined to the minimum value
that was observed in the sample, while they can decrease in the range of 2–9%, if voters’ information
increased up to its maximum value. Therefore, improving transparency and information would make
the citizens more responsible in their voting behavior [51], and this could contribute to the reduction
of corruption practices, and to the improvement of local public good provision [52].
The recent survey on public sector efficiency across various countries [21,22] reviews studies that
deal with a single service such as waste management, water supply, health, education, and public
transport, as well as studies that evaluate the global supply of services that are provided by local
governments. While the results of our study, which focuses on solid waste collection and disposal
activities of Italian municipalities, cannot be easily generalized to other services, it would be interesting
to apply our methodology to evaluate the impact of corruption and voters’ information on the efficiency
of providing the wide variety of services and facilities that are supplied by local governments.
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